Russia – Ukraine
On 2 June, Russia launched 656 drones and 73 missiles — the largest combined aerial assault of the war — killing 22 civilians (including children) and injuring 130+ across eight oblasts. ISW assessed Russia's mass strike was deliberately timed to exploit Ukraine's Patriot interceptor shortage. Ukraine intercepted the vast majority of cruise missiles and drones but only 27% of ballistic missiles. Ukraine struck back: on 3 June Ukrainian forces hit the St. Petersburg oil terminal and the Corvette Boyki in Kronstadt dry dock hours before Putin opened the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, with smoke visible to arriving guests. On 6 June, a second "unprecedented" wave struck the Kronstadt naval arsenal, the Petergofskaya oil depot, the Neste terminal in Lomonosov, a logistics centre in Bolshaya Izhora, and oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai; 144 drones were intercepted.iswabcnews
Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) disrupted a Russian GRU ground-based laser-designation network in Kyiv Oblast tasked with cuing ballistic missiles for the 2 June mass assault. Ukrainian ISR confirmed the Corvette Boyki's position in Kronstadt dry dock prior to the 3 June strike, enabling a 24-hour sensor-to-shooter cycle. ISW confirmed Ukraine struck Russian oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and military assets in Russian border regions on 6 June, demonstrating persistent long-range ISR coverage. Russian troops in the Mariupol–Berdyansk corridor are now disguising military vehicles as civilian transport (changing awning colours, repainting trucks white) to evade Ukrainian drone targeting.reuterscharter97
Ukraine's 3 June St. Petersburg strike — timed to coincide with Putin opening Russia's premier investment forum before 4,000 foreign guests — was designed to undercut his "business as usual" narrative. Striking Putin's home city during a flagship investment forum hosting 4,000 foreign dignitaries served as a stark visual refutation of Russian stability. President Zelenskyy reinforced this kinetic disruption by publishing an open letter that structurally reframed the conflict not as a geopolitical necessity, but as Putin's personal governance failure, aiming to fracture international tolerance for the war.iswwashingtontimes
- Ukraine's 27% ballistic intercept rate against a 180–250 missile reserve is a hard GBAD performance benchmark. Layered architectures effective against cruise missiles and drones can remain critically insufficient against saturating ballistic barrages.
- The SBU disruption of a GRU laser-designation network is relevant to counter-intelligence and installation protection planning — particularly for hardened facilities and C2 nodes. ISR-to-strike integration at the Kronstadt 24-hour sensor-to-shooter cycle sets the benchmark for what we must both execute and defend against.