Weekly Brief

Theatre	Phase	Trend	Progress to date
Russia–Ukraine	Attritional War	↑ Escalating	Frontline dynamics remain heavily deadlocked with high casualties on both sides, while the strategic air campaign intensifies on the eve of the upcoming NATO summit.
Israel–Lebanon	Phased Framework	→ Fragile	The situation remains highly volatile. Israel is awaiting verification from CENTCOM and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) regarding the LAF's readiness to deploy and secure evacuated zones before any physical redeployment begins. Concurrently, the IDF faces internal pressure to draw down approximately 10,000 reservists by late July due to fiscal constraints.
Israel–Gaza	Low-Intensity Stabilisation	→ Contested	Implementation of the broader US-brokered peace deal remains entirely stalled over the disarmament criteria for remaining Hamas factions. Severe border restrictions persist across all crossing points, choking recovery efforts.
Israel–US–Iran / Hormuz	Technical Diplomacy	→ Fragile but Improving	Immediate state-on-state kinetic exchange has cooled into a tense diplomatic negotiation over frozen assets and shipping lane safety. Israel's defence establishment is actively pushing to form a broader regional security architecture stretching from Europe to India to permanently counter Iranian power projection.
Thailand–Cambodia	Contested Border	→ Stable	On the land border, Cambodia lodged a formal diplomatic protest on 2 July after Royal Thai Army (2nd Army Area) engineering assets installed tactical barbed-wire fencing and made land adjustments in disputed zones near Preah Vihear and Oddar Meanchey provinces. Thailand maintains these actions are strictly localised security and counter-trafficking measures within their operational responsibility.

Key Developments

Theatre 01

Russia – Ukraine

Industrial-Scale Drone Force Structures

Force Generation

Russia's university drone recruitment drive — "Unmanned Systems Troops" branch

To sustain its newly established "Unmanned Systems Troops" branch, Russia has launched a nationwide recruitment campaign across 270 technical and vocational institutions, offering students one-year contracts, large sign-on bonuses (up to ₽5 million / ~$57,000), and promises of safe, non-frontline drone operator roles. However, intelligence tracking reveals that drone operations have become one of Russia's highest-attrition combat arms, with at least 920 operators confirmed killed since February 2022 — losses comparable to frontline artillery. In practice, recruits are routinely deployed to active combat zones with fewer than three months of training, frequently suffering casualties within weeks of arrival or facing forced transfers into high-risk infantry assault units despite their specialist contracts.bbc

Implication [Force Development · Mobilisation Readiness]

Russia and the US are both setting up dedicated drone commands. Drones are becoming their own arm, not an extra layer on top of tanks and infantry. Any modern force should decide whether it needs a similar dedicated structure.
Rushing drone operators through training gives you numbers today but weakens the force tomorrow. Russia is pushing crews to the front after less than three months and has lost 920 killed. That is a warning about what happens when training gets compressed.
An adversary short on manpower will train operators less and less but still send them out. Expect drone attacks from crews with weak skills — messier, less accurate, but more of them. Counter-drone plans should cover crude swarms, not just precise strikes from experts.

Emerging Tactics

Pentagon establishes centralised US drone command authority (DRPM-UxS)

On 29 June (released 2 July), US Defense Secretary Hegseth signed a memo establishing the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems (DRPM-UxS), centralising a $53.6 billion FY2026 budget to serve as the single joint integrator for all DoD autonomous and unmanned programs. Reporting directly to US Deputy Secretary Feinberg, this new office sits above individual military services with absolute authority over acquisition decisions and cross-service funding shifts for Group 1–3 UAS, USVs, ground robotics, and C-UAS. Structurally, the Pentagon's mass drone production body (Defense Autonomous Warfare Group) becomes subordinate to the DRPM-UxS, while the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) is designated as its sole commercial tech interface; a director has yet to be named, with hiring slated to begin within 30 days of appointment and a full program architecture review due within 90 days.militarytimes

Implication [Emerging Tactics · C2 · Force Development]

The US now runs its drone acquisition from a single office that outranks the individual services. That will move faster than letting each service run its own program. Any modern force needs to decide whether to buy drones the same way — top-down from a central office — or leave it to each formation.
A $53.6 billion budget means US drone production will hit the scale of tanks and artillery. Every US unit will have drones, in bulk. Counter-drone kit needs to be planned against that scale — not the smaller numbers seen today in Ukraine or Gaza.
Drone-swarm software is being bought and fielded now, not researched. AI-controlled swarms are a threat in the next few years, not the next decade. Training and equipment plans should match that timeline.

Theatre 02

Israel – Lebanon

Signed Framework, No Working Structure

Trilateral framework signed but structurally hollow

Israel, Lebanon, and the US signed the Trilateral Framework on 26 June; the security annex was leaked 28–30 June, detailing the MCG4L mandate, pilot zone four-step model, and conditions-based IDF redeployment. By 1 July, Israeli PM Netanyahu stood with troops in southern Lebanon declaring the IDF "will not leave," Iran warned this violated the MOU and threatened annulment, and Hezbollah flatly rejected the framework as "humiliating". The MCG4L has not been established; no third-party verifier has been named; not a single pilot zone has been activated.isw easternherald

Implication [CIMIC · Force Protection · C2]

A signed agreement can collapse within days if the enforcement bodies are not stood up or funded. Do not treat a signing ceremony as a deployment order.
Before joining any monitoring or observer mission, check three things: the coordination office is actually running and funded, a named third party has been chosen to verify compliance, and the pilot zones or checkpoints exist on the ground. If any of these is missing, the mission risks being asked to police an agreement with no working structure behind it.

Theatre 03

Israel – Gaza

IDF Now Holds 70% of the Strip

Civil-Military

UN Security Council briefing confirms IDF now holds ~70% of Gaza

On 29 June, the UN Security Council held a major briefing regarding the long-standing, heavily compromised ceasefire. The UN confirmed that despite the nominal pause in large-scale manoeuvre warfare, localised kinetic strikes have killed over 1,000 individuals since the initial ceasefire took effect. UN field documentation and official Israeli statements delivered during the session confirmed that the IDF has steadily expanded its physical consolidation and access-restricted footprints, now commanding approximately 70% of the Gaza Strip. This creeping infrastructure expansion has severely restricted the physical space available to the civilian population, concentrating displaced persons into high-density zones while access to dual-use equipment and humanitarian clearance remains entirely stalled.un

Implication [Civil-Military · Force Protection]

If deployed to a place with a nominal ceasefire but heavy ground control by one side — like Gaza today — plan for combat, not for observing. That means combat-level armour and force protection, medical support for combat casualties, and clear authority to return fire.
Bring independent means to verify what is happening on the ground. Do not rely on statements from either party.
Assume dual-use equipment and humanitarian supplies will be blocked at the border. Have a backup logistics plan ready before deploying.

Theatre 04

Israel – US – Iran

Iranian Toll Imposition & "Funeral Pause"

Emerging TacticsEnablers

Iranian toll imposition and one-week "funeral pause"

Following the expiration of the 60-day uncharged transit window, Iran aggressively accelerated its enforcement of strict route controls and mandatory transit fees in the strait. Iran confirmed its intent to impose Strait tolls from mid-August ($1 per barrel of cargo oil) as a coercive legal instrument to permanently institutionalise Strait control claims. The US agreed to a one-week "funeral pause" in kinetic operations tied to Khamenei's burial (4–9 July), during which no nuclear-track talks occurred and no bridging of Doha differences was achieved. Eight vessels turned back at Hormuz on 5 July despite the active stand-down. The 17 August toll imposition deadline is now 42 days away.yahoo reuters

Implication [SLOC · Maritime Intelligence]

Adversaries can take control of shipping lanes without firing a shot. They use fees, mandatory routes, inspection rules, and "safety" pretexts to make an international waterway operate as their own territory. Track their maritime rules as closely as their naval movements — a change in the paperwork is often the first sign of a de facto closure.
A blockade does not need sunken ships. If insurance rates rise, if shipowners re-route around a chokepoint, or if fewer vessels enter the passage, the adversary is winning without firing. Watch merchant traffic as a live indicator of whether the pressure is working.

Theatre 05

Thailand – Cambodia

Fencing as Creeping Annexation

Combat Engineering

Cambodia protests Thai barbed-wire fencing and terrain modification in disputed zones

Cambodia lodged a formal diplomatic protest accusing the Royal Thai Army (2nd Army Area) of breaching de-escalation protocols by installing tactical barbed-wire fencing and conducting terrain modifications within disputed border zones. The engineering encroachments occurred on 2 July at two distinct focal points: the Mom Bei area (Preah Vihear) and the Chob Ruan area (Oddar Meanchey). Cambodia maintains these actions violate both the December 2025 General Border Committee Joint Statement and the 2000 Land Boundary MoU.freshnewsasia

Implication [Combat Engineering · Border Security]

Combat engineers doing terrain modification on disputed ground are doing diplomatic work, not just tactical work. A fence, a berm, or a repaired road becomes a political fact once local traders and civilians adapt to it — the other side then has to pay a diplomatic cost to remove it.
The lesson for own-force posture: be able to quickly install physical infrastructure — fences, berms, checkpoints — on disputed ground, harden it, and hold it. The side that puts up permanent-looking structures first sets the reference line for the negotiations that follow.

BLUF — Bottom Line Up Front