Russia – Ukraine
Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) adjusted their strike methodology to capitalise on a critical Ukrainian vulnerability: a severe deficit in anti-ballistic missile interceptors (such as PAC-3 Patriot systems). During a large-scale strike package launched overnight on 5–6 July, Russian forces deployed a mix of 351 attack drones and 68 missiles. While Ukrainian air defences successfully intercepted nearly all sub-sonic cruise missiles (like the Kh-101) and Shahed-type drones, none of the 29 launched ballistic missiles (comprising Iskander-M and S-400 systems) were shot down. Operational data indicates that the VKS is intentionally decreasing the total volume of ballistic missiles per strike package. This shift leverages the reality that mass saturation is no longer required to penetrate and overwhelm Ukraine's depleted tactical air defence umbrella. Highlighting this defensive gap, the 6 July strike caused severe kinetic damage across the Kyiv region. In the Kyiv suburb of Vyshneve, ballistic impacts severely damaged hundreds of homes and forced the evacuation of roughly 600 residents due to the hazard of unexploded ordnance.iswopb
- Russia is now getting missiles through with smaller salvos, not big ones. That is because Ukraine's expensive interceptors have run low. Any modern force should plan for the same problem: expensive missile defence runs out fast. Keep the top-end interceptors for critical targets only, and back them up with cheaper, faster-to-build interceptors for everything else. Ukraine's fast-tracked FREYA project (European radars, local missiles) is one working example.
- A single Patriot interceptor takes 24–30 months to build because of specialised sub-parts like solid rocket motors. If a war starts, you cannot buy them fast enough. Ukraine secured a US production licence at political level this week — but you have to lock in the licences and stockpile the parts years in advance. Just-in-time supply chains do not work for missile defence.