15–28 September 2026
CoveringRussia–Ukraine · US–Israel–Iran · Israel–Lebanon · Israel–Gaza · Thailand–Cambodia
Ukraine adapted Operation Vivaldi by deploying UGVs to demine 30 km of supply routes while utilising EW, UAS interdiction, and counter-drone strikes to sever the ISR–C2–logistics chain supporting Russian motorcycle- and ATV-borne infiltration units north of Lyman. Source: ISW, 26 Sep
Tehran and its proxies expanded a multi-theatre A2/AD envelope—combining Strait of Hormuz harassment, subterranean expansion at Natanz, and Houthi consolidation over the Bab al-Mandeb choke point—prompting US air-route supply interdictions and explicit Israeli preparation for deep-penetration counter-facility strikes. Source: Times of Israel · The Korea Herald
Israel reorganised its footprint into a permanent Yellow Zone posture using hardened C2 nodes, concealed vehicle parks, and overhead protection, utilising sensor-to-shooter links with indirect fires to counter Hezbollah’s dispersed UAS and ATGM threats. Source: Anadolu Agency
Israel transitioned to a persistent counter-reconstitution campaign along the Yellow Line, fusing FININT and real-time ISR to dismantle a 2 km subterranean tunnel network and execute precision strikes against Hamas’s leadership and financial infrastructure. Source: Caliber.az
The Thai Army placed forward troops along sensitive border sectors—including Mounts 225/350 and the Ta Kwai temple area—on high combat readiness, establishing a dispersed, hardened defensive posture to deter localised indirect fires, mine hazards, and UAS escalation. Source: Thai PBS World
Blue = the side the lesson is drawn from Red = opposing force. Based on Russia–Ukraine reporting. Open the full analysis under each strip for details and sources.
How to read the ratings
Russia–Ukraine, north of Lyman · 15–28 Sep 2026
Preliminary · Medium confidence Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported the gains, but Reuters could not verify them, and the fuel-to-jamming link is ISW’s assessment.
LessonAn enemy’s watch-and-strike system may break at its support links, like fuel and power, not just at its sensors. This link is assessed, not proven.
Questions to askWhat keeps the enemy’s sensors and strike systems running, and what would show they have actually weakened?
| Question | Preliminary findings |
|---|---|
| Operating problem | Persistent drone observation and strikes made it difficult to concentrate and move ground forces without detection. |
| What Ukraine did | Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported disrupting Russian logistics and fuel supplies before and during its advance. It also described counter-drone measures and strict information security intended to reduce Russian awareness. ISW assessed that reduced fuel availability may have strained generator-powered Russian EW, improving Ukrainian drone freedom of action in support of limited mechanised advances. Source: ISW, 17 Sep |
| What changed on the ground | Ukraine’s corps reported clearing Russian infiltration groups and recapturing territory; Reuters could not independently verify its initial figures. ISW assessed that the operation demonstrated a limited return of tactical manoeuvre, not a general breakthrough. Source: Reuters, 15 Sep · Critical Threats, 20 Sep |
| Learning point | Striking logistics may have affected more than resupply: it may also have reduced the power available to Russian EW. That suggests a possible chain — fuel disruption → weaker EW → greater Ukrainian drone freedom → a temporary opportunity for ground movement. It is an assessed mechanism, not a proven causal account of the operation. Source: ISW, 17 Sep |
The weak point in an opponent’s reconnaissance–strike system may sit in its support dependencies, not only in its sensors or drones. Disrupting those dependencies could briefly make manoeuvre possible. Source: ISW, 17 Sep
In a dense, connected environment, which dependencies keep an opposing surveillance-and-strike system functioning, and what evidence would indicate that its effectiveness has actually fallen?
Russia–Ukraine · 15–28 Sep 2026
Preliminary · Medium confidence The interception rates come from Ukraine’s air force, reported by Reuters, and have not been independently verified.
LessonA counter that beats today’s drone can fail against a modified one.
Questions to askCan our counter-drone kit spot a changed threat and adapt, without losing cover against the others?
| Question | Preliminary findings |
|---|---|
| Previously effective response | Ukraine developed relatively cheap interceptor drones against slower, propeller-driven attack drones. Its air force reported intercepting more than 90% of those earlier variants. Source: Reuters, 22 Sep · Reuters, 15 Sep |
| Russia’s adaptation | Russia expanded use of jet-powered variants. Reuters reported that their speed and higher flight profiles reduced the effectiveness of existing interceptor drones and some mobile air-defence teams. |
| Observed performance gap | Ukraine’s air force reported about 60% interception of the newer variants. That does not mean all Ukrainian air defence is obsolete; it identifies a performance gap against a changed target set. |
| Response under development | Faster interceptors, other lower-cost weapons, and different engagement approaches. Reuters reported successful individual intercepts, alongside difficult trials and unresolved production and funding constraints. None is yet demonstrated here as a replacement at scale. |
A countermeasure can remain effective against the threat it was built for while becoming inadequate against a modified variant. The attacker did not simply add more drones; it changed the target’s speed and flight profile enough to put a successful defensive method outside its useful engagement conditions. The critical issue is the time lag between detecting that performance drop and fielding an affordable replacement at scale.
If a protection concept depends on a particular class of counter-UAS system, its useful test is not whether it defeats today’s reference drone. It is whether the concept can recognise and respond to a changed threat envelope while preserving coverage of other threats.
Russia–Ukraine · 15–28 Sep 2026
Preliminary · Medium confidence Medium for the pipeline shutdown, which Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported. Lower for its effect on Russian drones and jamming, which has not been measured.
LessonFuel powers sensors, jammers and comms, not just vehicles. Cutting it can blind a force before it stops it moving.
Questions to askWhich of our sensing, EW and comms kit runs on fuel-powered electricity, and how long could it last through a disruption?
| Question | Preliminary findings |
|---|---|
| What changed? | Ukraine’s 3rd Army Corps reported that strikes shut a pipeline supplying a substantial share of Russian diesel in occupied Luhansk. It said Russian forces had to move fuel by a longer tanker route. These quantities and route effects come from Ukrainian military reporting. Source: ISW, 22 Sep |
| Why is this different? | Ukraine’s corps said reduced fuel availability would make it harder to run generators, charge drone batteries and operate EW equipment. ISW assessed that the interdiction supported Ukrainian counteroffensive operations north of Lyman. That is a plausible fuel → electrical power → drone/EW availability → battlefield freedom of action chain, but its individual links have not all been independently measured. Source: ISW, 22 Sep |
| What was the countermeasure? | Russian forces reportedly shifted to road-tanker delivery. The open question is whether that substitution restores fuel reliably or creates a slower, more exposed supply chain. Source: ISW, 22 Sep |
| What is not proven? | We cannot conclude that fuel disruption alone caused Ukrainian advances, quantify how much Russian drone/EW activity fell, or judge how quickly Russian forces adapted. |
Preliminary CSI observation — Explore: a fuel supply system can be a hidden dependency of the sense-and-strike system, not only of vehicles. Its disruption may reduce battlefield awareness or protection before it visibly stops manoeuvre. Conversely, shifting to tankers may preserve supply but change its cost, predictability and vulnerability.
Which critical sensing, EW, communications and support functions depend on fuel-powered electricity, and how long could they operate through a disruption?